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Zimbabwe: Trends and Prospects

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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ZIMBABWE: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

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FOREWORD

This paper assesses recent trends in Zimbabwe and prospects for stability there over the next two or three years. It also addresses implications for the United States and contingencies that could affect US interests.

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Zimbabwe is important to the United States because instability there would further unsettle the southern African region. The key to stability will be Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ability and willingness to maintain a moderate, pragmatic course in dealing with the country's problems and in meeting his socialist goals. This will not always be easy because his power rests in part on his responsiveness to the Central Committee of his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which is dominant among the country's Shona-speaking majority. The ZANU-PF Central Committee collectively tends toward more doctrinaire socialist policies and more radical Third World rhetoric. Mugabe thus far has maintained control of the party and the government by balancing competing interests.

In the near term, much will depend on how Mugabe handles his longstanding nationalist rival Joshua Nkomo and Nkomo's supporters among the country's Ndebele-speaking minority. Detaining or prosecuting Nkomo for alleged subversive activity would risk making him a martyr and could provoke spontaneous violence and polarization of the political climate along tribal lines. Over the longer term, however, an accommodation of some sort with the Ndebeles seems likely. This might enable Mugabe virtually to attain his goal of a one-party state before changing the constitution. Although he may propose constitutional amendments before the next election comes due in 1985, he probably will honor his pledge not to make changes unconstitutionally.

The slow pace of the Zimbabwean "revolution" nevertheless has intensified black desires for change. As long as these remain largely unfulfilled, Mugabe will be vulnerable to criticism from those who advocate more rapid and radical change. Many whites are not pleased with some of the trends they see, but most will stay so long as they enjoy a prosperous lifestyle, do not fear for their physical safety, and see a role for themselves in Zimbabwe's future.

Zimbabwe's economic problems, stemming largely from a lower growth rate and lower investment levels than expected, are unlikely to be a source of serious instability over the next two or three years. There are signs that local investors and at least some foreign companies are beginning to adjust to the country's new economic realities and are finding

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ways to live with them and still make a profit. A basic problem that foreign capital faces in Zimbabwe, however, is the anticapitalist bias of most of the country's political leadership. This portends periodic backsliding on economic pragmatism that could deter critical Western business and donor support.

Given the likelihood that Mugabe will be able to maintain control domestically, the greatest threat to stability probably will be South Africa. Pretoria will use a combination of economic leverage and covert actions to keep Zimbabwe economically dependent and to remind it of South Africa's ability to wreak havoc.

Zimbabwean-US relations are good, but Mugabe's socialist principles and his government's tendency to view the world through a Third World lens indicate that Zimbabwe will not side with Washington on many issues. Mugabe views Pretoria's increasing willingness to deal aggressively with Zimbabwe and its neighbors as partly a result of the warming in US-South African relations.

Mugabe distrusts Moscow because of its past support for Nkomo. Mugabe might conclude that he has no alternative to improving relations with Moscow, however, if the West—particularly the United States—does not succeed in getting South Africa to curb its aggressive policies toward Zimbabwe and its neighbors, to agree to a peaceful settlement in Namibia, or to begin at least to broaden political participation in South Africa. Even so, Mugabe's suspicion of Moscow's intentions will act as a brake on any future warming trend.

US objectives in Zimbabwe probably would be jeopardized if Mugabe were to lose power. If Mugabe were removed from the scene, the current most likely successor (Deputy Prime Minister Simon Muzenda) might have difficulty maintaining majority support in ZANU-PF, and a period of substantial ferment and testing of strength could result. The winner of any succession struggle would have to have impressive credentials in the ZANU-PF liberation movement.

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DISCUSSION

Introduction: Continuity and Change

1. Zimbabwe has changed less during its first two years of independence than most whites had feared and many blacks had hoped. This continuity with the past is largely a result of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's pragmatic style, his conciliatory policies toward erstwhile white enemies and black rivals at least until recently, and his cautious approach to change.

2. Mugabe has been slow to capitalize on the mandate for change that his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), won by its decisive victory in the February 1980 election, in which it obtained 57 of the 80 black seats in the lower house of parliament. His reform program has consisted mainly of raising minimum wages, providing free health care for the poor and free primary education, and promoting Africanization of the civil service and the military. He has moved especially slowly on land reform, long considered the principal objective of the struggle for black rule.

3. Many whites had feared that Mugabe, a self-styled Marxist-Leninist, was a dangerous radical who would try to transform the country overnight. The fact that he did not do so has persuaded the vast majority of whites, who comprise about 2 percent of the population, to give the government a chance. Whites continue to play key roles in the economy, the security services, the civil service, and the courts, and their privileged lifestyle has changed very little. Even so, 35,000 to 40,000 whites have left Zimbabwe since independence.

4. Whites generally have been less upset with the changes made by the new government than by the tone it has set. From the beginning, they have been uncomfortable with the media's use of the term "comrade" as an honorific for those the government regards as its friends and its insertion of the term "racist" before any mention of South Africa. Similarly, the names of streets, hospitals, and most recently towns and cities have been changed (like that of the

country itself) to African names—the capital, long known as Salisbury, is now called Harare. While some whites view these and other changes as inevitable and adjust to them, others take them as a sign that they have no future in Zimbabwe.

5. Still, most of the changes fostered by the new government have enhanced stability:

- Restoring peace to the countryside.
- Completing the formal integration of the two former rival guerrilla armies with the old Rhodesian forces into a new national army.
- Encouraging the movement of at least some blacks into previously all-white residential areas and institutions, including the integration of at least a few blacks into white schools.
- Implementing modest social and economic reforms.

More important, especially from the standpoint of the whites, were the changes the government did not make: it has left the commercial farmers largely untouched and the rest of the preindependence economic structure essentially intact.

6. The cost of the slow pace of the Zimbabwean "revolution" has been to intensify black desires for change. As long as these remain largely unfulfilled, Mugabe will be vulnerable to criticism from those who advocate more rapid and radical change. Mugabe will feel increasingly compelled to press ahead with the "revolution" to demonstrate that the liberation struggle had not been in vain.

The Political/Security Situation

Nkomo's Ouster

7. Politically, the moderate phase of the Zimbabwean "revolution" may have ended in mid-February 1982 when Mugabe expelled Minister Without Portfolio Joshua Nkomo and two of Nkomo's closest colleagues from the cabinet. Using the pretext of the discovery of large caches of arms, ammunition, and

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other military equipment on farms owned by companies run by Nkomo's party, the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU),¹ Mugabe tried to justify the move by accusing Nkomo of plotting a coup. In addition, the government has dissolved and seized the property of 12 companies owned by PF-ZAPU, detained several prominent members of the party including its two former top military leaders, and indicated an intention to prosecute Nkomo and others connected with the farms on which the caches were found.

8. Mugabe aims to destroy Nkomo politically and thereby to remove the principal impediment to tightening ZANU-PF's hold on power. Nkomo's denial of knowledge of the caches is not credible, and the mere fact of their existence may be incriminating enough to charge Nkomo—who was a director of two of the companies that owned farms on which caches were found—with at least some offense.

9. The charge of coup plotting, however, is almost certainly false. It has been common knowledge in Zimbabwe that both the PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF guerrilla armies had cached weapons. They did so

primarily for defensive reasons, to be prepared for the contingency of civil war or at least for a resumption of violence between members of their rival guerrilla armies like that in Bulawayo in November 1980 and February 1981.

10. Mugabe tried to bolster his case by charging that Nkomo had twice approached the South Africans to gain their support in attempting a coup shortly after Mugabe's election in February 1980. Mugabe said that his source for this information was former Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, the last commander of the Rhodesian armed forces. Mugabe had appointed Walls as the first head of the Zimbabwean military high command and subsequently forced him into exile after Walls publicly acknowledged complicity in a Rhodesian Army plot against Mugabe that never got off the ground. Mugabe said that Walls had told him shortly before he left Zimbabwe of having himself acted as an intermediary for Nkomo in his approaches to the South Africans but that Pretoria had rebuffed Nkomo. Walls has publicly denied Mugabe's story, but Nkomo's reputation for dealing with anyone who might advance his ambitions lends it plausibility in Zimbabwe.

11. If Mugabe succeeds in convincing the public of Nkomo's collusion with South Africa, this could provide a political kiss of death, as it did for Mugabe's predecessor—Zimbabwe Rhodesian Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa. In any event, Mugabe has all the resources of the state, including the emergency powers that were long used by Ian Smith's regime against him and Nkomo and their respective supporters, to help build a case against Nkomo.

12. Mugabe evidently is calculating that he can destroy Nkomo without forcing the rest of PF-ZAPU into open opposition. He is counting on longstanding dissatisfaction with Nkomo's dictatorial methods of running the party and with Nkomo's propensity for enlarging his personal fortune at the party's expense to soften the reaction of the rank and file. Mugabe evidently believes that ZANU-PF eventually can make an accommodation with a post-Nkomo leadership of PF-ZAPU.²

² Mugabe restored PF-ZAPU representation in the cabinet to four in April 1982, one less than it had been before Nkomo's dismissal. The three most recent appointments were made, nevertheless, without consulting Nkomo or other top PF-ZAPU officials.

¹ A bit of the history of the major parties in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle is necessary to clarify the changing use of the terms ZAPU, ZANU, and Patriotic Front.

ZAPU was founded in 1961 with Nkomo as its leader. Mugabe originally was a member of ZAPU, but he followed Ndabaningi Sithole and others in splitting off from ZAPU in 1963 to form ZANU. Mugabe wrested the leadership of ZANU from Sithole during the period from 1964 to 1974 when they and most of the other leading black Zimbabwean nationalists, including Nkomo, were detained by Rhodesian authorities.

The term Patriotic Front dates from the period immediately preceding the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia in 1976. It was the name given to the nominal alliance imposed on ZANU and ZAPU by the Frontline States (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana) to enhance their leverage over the two groups and the leverage of the liberation side vis-a-vis the Ian Smith regime in the negotiating process.

After the Rhodesian conflict was finally settled at the Lancaster House Conference in London in the fall of 1979, ZANU decided to contest the election of February 1980 as a party in its own right rather than as part of a combined Patriotic Front. Nkomo, in an apparent attempt to acquire whatever luster had become attached to the name Patriotic Front, decided that ZAPU would contest the election under that rubric. The British electoral authorities ruled that Nkomo's party would run under the title of PF-ZAPU and that ZANU should run as ZANU-PF, and those terms have been in use ever since.

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13. Such an accommodation would be a prudent step because PF-ZAPU is the political arm of the country's Ndebele-speaking minority, which represents almost 20 percent of the black vote; PF-ZAPU holds 20 seats in parliament and dominates the western third of the country. Without an accommodation, a resumption of Bulawayo-style violence would be more likely to recur, possibly leading eventually to insurrection and opening the way for foreign (most likely South African) meddling.

Moving Toward a One-Party State

14. The decision to oust Nkomo was almost certainly aimed at advancing ZANU-PF's longstanding goal of a one-party state. Nkomo was regarded as an obstacle to that objective because he would not consider allowing PF-ZAPU to merge with ZANU-PF except on his own terms. Still, Nkomo has no objection to the idea in principle probably because he shares ZANU-PF's assumption that a one-party state would tend to provide greater stability than the existing system, in which the major parties are divided largely along tribal lines. Though there are a few Ndebeles in ZANU-PF, it is essentially the party of the country's Shona-speaking majority, which constitutes 71 percent of the black population. (See table 1 and the map on page 25.)

15. Politically conscious black Zimbabweans tend to view Western-style parliamentary democracy as less compatible with African traditions than a one-party state. Key members of the Zimbabwean political elite criticize multiparty political systems for fostering opposition for the sake of opposition and for frustrating the will of the people through constant campaigning for the next election. They tend to view the parliamentary process as a frivolous "bourgeois" anachronism that is essentially a waste of time.

16. Such views have long been predominant in ZANU-PF, which is governed far more democratically than PF-ZAPU. Whereas Nkomo's word has virtually always been law in his party, ZANU-PF tends to make decisions only after a consensus is arrived at through long discussion in the party Central Committee. The difference between the two approaches reflects the difference between Ndebele and Shona conceptions of the role of the chief. The Ndebele leader has full authority, whereas a Shona chief is more a spokesman for the tribal consensus than a dominant leader.

Table 1

Tribal Composition in Zimbabwe

Tribes (Subtribe)	Percent of Black Population	Approximate Number
Shona ^a	71	5,571,000
Karanga	16	1,256,000
Zezuru	13	1,020,000
Manyika	7	549,000
Ndau	4	314,000
Korekore	3	235,000
Kalanga ^b	2	157,000
Other Shona ^c	26	2,040,000
Ndebele.....	16	1,256,000
Others (includes Sena, Tonga, Venda, Sotho, Hlengwe)	13	1,020,000
Total black population ...	100	7,847,000

^a The Shonas were among the waves of Bantu tribes that migrated from central to southern Africa several centuries ago. A series of Shona empires controlled much of what became Rhodesia before the Ndebeles, also a Bantu tribe, first entered Shona territory from South Africa in the 1820s. The Ndebeles were better organized and militarily stronger than the more numerous but scattered Shona subtribes. By the mid-1800s the Ndebeles had subjugated, and in some cases absorbed, many of the Shona peoples.

^b For geographical and historical reasons, the Kalangas have maintained closer ties with the Ndebeles than with other Shona subtribes.

^c This category designates blacks identified in the 1969 census only as Shonas, not as members of a particular Shona subtribe.

17. As president of ZANU during the last years of the liberation struggle, Mugabe never concealed his or his party's preference for a one-party state. He has always conditioned this goal, however, with the proviso that it would come about only if it had popular approval, presumably in some form of referendum. Mugabe is constrained from imposing a one-party state by having sworn to uphold the Lancaster House Constitution, which bars amendment of certain entrenched clauses, including "the right . . . to form or belong to political parties," before 1990 without unanimous approval of the lower house of parliament which, in turn, according to the constitution, must have 20 members elected by whites until 1987 at least.

18. Mugabe gave little public emphasis to the one-party idea from the time of the Lancaster House Conference until last August when he began his first

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major speaking campaign since the election. Addressing mainly ZANU-PF party faithful in several parts of the country, Mugabe floated the idea frequently. He also grew increasingly strident in his rhetoric, accusing Muzorewa and former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith of subversion and threatening to detain them. He linked them personally with his longstanding but unsubstantiated charge that Pretoria has been training 5,000 former Rhodesians, especially onetime members of the armed auxiliaries that backed Muzorewa, to "destabilize" Zimbabwe.

19. The harsher tone of Mugabe's rhetoric foreshadowed his renewed emphasis in January 1982 on the primacy of the party. In his New Year's message, he said that in the future the government would adopt only those policies that had the approval of the ZANU-PF Central Committee. Later in January, he declared that "ZANU-PF will rule . . . forever."

20. A combination of factors contributed to Mugabe's switch to tough talk and action. First, there were signs that the government was losing support largely because of deteriorating economic conditions. Even before he went on the hustings, the small, generally feckless opposition parties of Muzorewa, Smith, and Ndabaningi Sithole had begun to strike responsive chords by criticizing the government's failure to resolve fuel shortages or to control the rising cost of living.

21. Secondly, the coalition with PF-ZAPU had always been uneasy. Mugabe knew that Nkomo was frustrated by his subordinate role and embittered because he believed that Mugabe, whom Nkomo at 64 considered a young upstart (though Mugabe is 58), had stolen the leadership of the liberation movement from him. Mugabe did nothing to attack Nkomo directly until February, however, though the government's banning last October of political meetings that did not have prior police approval put a damper on rallies by PF-ZAPU as well as other minority parties.

22. Another reason for the change in Mugabe's tactics may have been the growing sense that Zimbabwe was under siege from South Africa. In rapid succession beginning early in 1981, South Africa announced that it would allow a longstanding bilateral preferential trade agreement to expire, withdrew 25 locomotives and 150 mechanics on loan to Zimbabwe's railways, slowed the turnaround times of Zimbabwean rail traffic through South Africa, and announced that

it would not renew the work permits of the roughly 20,000 Zimbabweans legally employed in South Africa. A series of violent incidents, which Mugabe and his colleagues invariably attributed to South African agents, heightened their sense of insecurity even further: in July the murder of the leading representative in Zimbabwe of the African National Congress/South Africa (ANC/SA); in August a major explosion at a large ammunition dump; in October the sabotage of the major Mozambican rail and road bridges and the attached petroleum pipeline on Zimbabwe's main non-South African route to the sea; in November the escape of a white Zimbabwean Army officer charged with spying for South Africa, with the apparent collusion of the white Zimbabwean police inspector responsible for investigating the murder of the ANC/SA representative; and in December the blowing up of the conference room at ZANU-PF headquarters at a time when the party's Central Committee normally would have been scheduled to meet.

23. Probably most important, Mugabe's moves reflected pressure from the ZANU-PF Central Committee to tighten the party's grip on power. His initial decision to go to the hustings probably had been prompted by a minirebellion within the party leadership late last July over allegations that Mugabe had been running the government without sufficient regard for the ZANU-PF tradition of collective decision-making. The result, apart from his more strident rhetoric and frequent mention of a one-party state, was agreement to hold regular meetings of the Central Committee and its Executive Committee. Similarly, Mugabe's New Year's message, in which he reverted to his traditional role as spokesman and instrument of the party, almost certainly had been spurred by a Central Committee meeting in late December that reaffirmed the primacy of the party over the government and decided to increase the momentum toward a one-party state.

Strengths and Vulnerabilities in Mugabe's Position

24. The way that Mugabe has carried out the directives of the ZANU-PF leadership has enhanced not only the party's position but his own. The moves against PF-ZAPU, although executed with breathtaking speed, clearly were planned with great care. They reflect the astuteness and skill that have enabled Mugabe both to maintain the leadership of his party and to consolidate his personal grip on power.

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Table 2

ZANU-PF Central Committee

(Asterisk signifies members of the influential Executive Committee)

Name	Highest Level of Education	Tribe (subtribe) or Nationality	Age
Justin Chauke	Little formal education	Shona (Manyika or Zezuru)	40
Sarudzai Chinamaropa (Ms.)	Little formal education	Shona (Zezuru)	35
Richard Hove	B. Commerce, U. of Bombay, India	Shona (Karanga)	47
*Ernest Kadungure	High school	Shona (Zezuru)	40
*Kumbirai Kangai	M.A., Public Administration, U. of California, United States	Shona (Manyika, but identifies with Karangas)	44
Robson Manyika	High school	Shona (Manyika or Zezuru)	47
*Robert Mugabe	Five Bachelor's degrees, one from U. of Ft. Hare, South Africa, and four by correspondence (including LL.B) from U. of London, England	Shona (Zezuru)	58
Sally Mugabe (Ms.)	Teachers Training College, Accra, Ghana; studied home economics at U. of London, England	Ghanaian	50
*Emmerson Munangagwa	LL.B., Lusaka, Zambia	Shona (Karanga)	39
Didymus Mutasa	Diploma, U. of Birmingham, England	Shona (Manyika)	46
*Dzingai Mutumbuka	Ph.D., Chemistry, U. of Sussex, England	Shona (Karanga)	36
*Don Muvhuti	B.A. or M.A., U. of London, England	Shona (Zezuru)	Unknown
*Simon Muzenda	High school	Shona (Karanga)	59
William Ndangana	Little formal education	Shona (Manyika)	42
*Teurai Ropa Nhongo (Ms.)	Little formal education	Shona (Zezuru)	27
Enos Nkala	LL.B., B. Commerce, U. of South Africa (by correspondence)	Ndebele	50
Maurice Nyagumbo	About 6th grade	Shona (Manyika)	57
Sheba Tavarwisa (Ms.)	Teachers Training College	Shona (Karanga)	35
Mayor Urimbo	Little formal education	Shona (Zezuru or Karanga; does not appear to support Karanga interests)	38
Eddison Zvobgo	LL.B., U. of London, England (by correspondence); M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and LL.M., Harvard U., United States	Shona (Karanga)	46

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25. Mugabe governs by balancing competing interests within the party and the government. A key change in the cabinet shuffle that accompanied the moves against Nkomo was to enlarge the power and prestige of Bernard Chidzero, Mugabe's savvy, moderate economic adviser. Mugabe combined Chidzero's previous portfolio as Minister of Economic Planning with that of the Ministry of Finance, which in Zimbabwe has the authority equivalent in the United States to that of both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Chidzero's promotion is a sign that Mugabe intends to continue a gradual, pragmatic approach to social and economic change. Chidzero is one of the ablest of the highly educated black technocrats on whom Mugabe has relied to gain control of the old Rhodesian bureaucracy, but he lacks a strong base in ZANU-PF.

26. By contrast, Mugabe's appointment of Herbert Ushewokunze as Minister of Home Affairs was largely a gesture to more radical sentiment in the Central Committee and among the party rank and file. Ushewokunze was fired last November as Minister of Health after criticizing once too often the slow pace of Africanization in the government. He is anathema to whites because of his unrestrained criticism of the country's white medical establishment and his promotion of traditional African methods of healing, but he is very popular among blacks. The fact that he was implicated in a bizarre trial last year involving a spirit medium who instructed ex-guerrillas to kill a white farm couple must make his appointment to the Home Ministry, which has responsibility over the police and for implementing the emergency powers, particularly upsetting to whites.

27. There is also a tribal aspect to Mugabe's methods of maintaining control. The ZANU-PF Central Committee is largely a microcosm of the various subtribes of the Shona-speaking people. Mugabe is a member of the second-largest Shona subgroup—the Zezurus—and as such the leader of the non-Karanga majority from which the party's leadership has always been chosen, probably out of fear that the largest Shona subtribe—the Karangas—would otherwise dominate the party. (See table 2 and the map on page 25.) In the years before independence, the main challenges to Mugabe's leadership came from Karanga dissidents, but Mugabe was able to surmount them because he had the support of key Karanga leaders like

Deputy Prime Minister Simon Muzenda and Intelligence Chief Emmerson Munangagwa.

28. Mugabe used the February cabinet shuffle to advance the influence of a number of his fellow Zezurus: Chidzero, Ushewokunze, and the former Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Sydney Sekeremayi, who joined Munangagwa as a Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office, with responsibility for defense. Karangas reportedly see these appointments, and that of another Zezuru, Enos Chikowore, as Minister of Local Government and Town Planning, as a slap in the face and a diminution of their influence. They note that Munangagwa must now share his security responsibilities with Sekeremayi and that another Karanga leader, Eddison Zvobgo, had not been informed in advance that he was to be given a new portfolio, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, which would not become operational for some time. Some Karangas even suspect that the addition of Posts and Telecommunications to the portfolio of Information Minister Nathan Shamuyarira, like Chidzero another highly educated technocrat and also a Zezuru without strong party roots, will enable Shamuyarira to tap telephones and to intercept mail independently of Intelligence Chief Munangagwa. Many Karangas view these shifts as a failure of Muzenda, as the senior Karanga in the party and the government, to protect their interests, and they may now look to someone less close to Mugabe to do so.

The Future of the Whites

29. Zimbabwe's white community of approximately 180,000 is clearly concerned about the implications of Mugabe's recent moves. Even before the reappointment of Ushewokunze and Nkomo's ouster, whites were worried over the increasing harshness in Mugabe's rhetoric, his trial balloons about a one-party state, his charges of white collusion in South African subversive activities, and the detention of at least 16 whites, including several for hoarding arms and one member of parliament whom Mugabe has accused of plotting to overthrow the government with some former ZAPU guerrillas.

30. Mugabe and his colleagues have lost patience with recalcitrant whites who make little or no effort to accommodate to the new order. They have been particularly upset by evidence of disloyalty among whites in the security services, which they view as a

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potential fifth column for South Africa. Two white Zimbabwean intelligence officers confessed recently that they had been working for South African military intelligence since 1980, regularly providing information including some that was used in the assassination of the ANC/SA representative. Munangagwa has announced that the two would soon be brought to trial and linked them with the discovery that the former head of the Prime Minister's staff of bodyguards had also been a South African agent.

31. Mugabe welcomed the recent defection of nine white members of parliament from the Republican Front party—the first major crack in Ian Smith's hold on the political unity of the white community—and their decision to remain in parliament as independents. Mugabe appointed the leader of the nine, Chris Andersen, to the cabinet in April 1982 and made one of the others a deputy minister. The only other white in the cabinet is the Minister of Agriculture, Denis Norman, a former leader of the Commercial Farmers Union and also an independent. (See table 3.)

32. Mugabe has recently reassured the whites about his continuing commitment to a nonracial society, but the government may be planning further measures that will test their loyalty. Minister of Justice Simbi Mubako and other ministers have criticized the provisions in the constitution that allow dual citizenship and that reserve parliamentary seats for whites (20 of 100 seats in the House of Assembly and 10 of the 40 appointed seats in the largely ceremonial Senate). Although the reserved seats are protected by one of the entrenched clauses of the constitution that cannot be amended before 1987 without the unanimous vote of the lower house, dual citizenship could be repealed with only 70 votes. Perhaps one-third of the whites in Zimbabwe could claim citizenship in South Africa as well as Zimbabwe, and most of the remainder probably would claim British as well as Zimbabwean citizenship. The repeal of dual citizenship would force them to make a choice that they would prefer to avoid.

33. The white community has declined by about one-third from its peak of 278,000 in 1972. The exodus has continued since independence, notwithstanding severe restrictions on the amount of cash (\$1,400 per family) and personal possessions that emigrants are allowed to take with them and the problems in starting

over that most can expect wherever they move. In the years before independence at least half of the white emigrants went to South Africa, and since then the proportion seems closer to two-thirds. Approximately 1,500 to 2,000 whites leave the country every month, a slightly higher outflow than during the last years of the war.

34. Although the more than 7,500 immigrants last year included a substantial number of highly educated blacks returning from years of voluntary exile, the white exodus is causing a net loss of skilled persons (especially managers, entrepreneurs, engineers, teachers, nurses, miners, and railway workers). Some white professionals (doctors, lawyers, and architects, for example) are hanging on perhaps because they are more mobile and could leave at shorter notice. At the other extreme among whites who remain are the commercial farmers and industrialists who are not mobile because their assets are tied up in the country.

35. The future of the whites is uncertain. Most whites will stay so long as they continue to enjoy a prosperous lifestyle, do not fear for their physical safety, do not despair at the almost inevitable decline in educational and health standards as facilities are stretched to serve the black majority, and see for themselves a role in Zimbabwe's future. The outlook could change rapidly, however, because little trust or good will has been established between whites and the government. Although personal relations between blacks and whites are generally cordial if not close, many whites are not pleased with the trends they see or anticipate.

The Reliability of the Security Forces

36. There are about 74,000 men in the armed forces, including the police. The bulk of the military's combat strength and logistic support is made up of former Rhodesian forces: the three battalions of the former Rhodesian African Rifles and five white-led elite units—the 1st Parachute Battalion (the former Selous Scouts), the 1st Commando Battalion (the former Rhodesian Light Infantry), the Mounted Infantry Battalion (the former Grey's Scouts), the Armored Regiment, and the Artillery Regiment. The small but highly skilled and experienced Air Force remains essentially unintegrated except for a few technical and pilot trainees and a security unit. These forces—

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Table 3

The Zimbabwean Cabinet

Name	Highest Level of Education	Tribe (subtribe), Race, or Nationality	Age	Ministry	Party
Chris Andersen	Rhodes U., South Africa; lawyer	White	46	Minister of State (Public Service)	Independent
Bernard Chidzero	Ph.D., Political Science, McGill U., Canada	Shona (Zezuru)	55	Finance and Economic Planning	ZANU-PF
Enos Chikowore	Diploma, Economics	Shona (Zezuru)	42	Local Government and Town Planning	ZANU-PF
Victoria Chitepo (Ms.)	Teachers Training College, South Africa	South African (possibly Zulu), but with ties to Manyika	55	Natural Resources and Tourism	ZANU-PF
Richard Hove	B. Commerce, Bombay, India	Shona (Karanga)	47	Trade and Commerce	ZANU-PF
Ernest Kadungure	High school	Shona (Zezuru)	40	Youth, Sport and Recreation	ZANU-PF
Kumbirai Kangai	M.A., Public Administration, U. of California, United States	Shona (Manyika, but identifies with Karanga)	44	Labor and Social Welfare	ZANU-PF
Moven Mahachi	High school	Shona (Manyika)	33	Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development	ZANU-PF
Simbi Makoni	Ph.D., Pharmaceutical Chemistry, Polytechnic of Leicester, England	Shona (Manyika)	32	Industry and Energy	ZANU-PF
Witness Mangwende	Ph.D., International Relations, London School of Economics, England	Shona (Zezuru)	35	Foreign Affairs	ZANU-PF
Farai Masango	High school	Probably Shona (Zezuru)	41	Transport and Power	ZANU-PF
Cephas Msipa	B.A., U. of South Africa (by correspondence)	Shona (Karanga)	51	Water Resources and Development	PF-ZAPU
Simbi Mubako	B.A., LL.B., B.C.L., Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland; LL.M., M. Phil., Constitutional Law, London School of Economics, England; LL.M., Harvard U., United States	Shona (Karanga)	46	Justice and Constitutional Affairs	ZANU-PF
Robert Mugabe	Five Bachelor's degrees, one from U. of Ft. Hare, South Africa and four by correspondence (including LL.B.) from U. of London, England	Shona (Zezuru)	58	Prime Minister; Defense	ZANU-PF
Simbarashe Mumbengegwi	M. Ed., Monash U. Australia	Possibly Shona (Kalanga)	36	Housing	ZANU-PF
Emmerson Munangagwa	LL.B., Lusaka, Zambia	Shona (Karanga)	39	Minister of State (Security and Intelligence)	ZANU-PF

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Table 3 (Continued)

The Zimbabwean Cabinet

Name	Highest Level of Education	Tribes (subtribe), Race, or Nationality	Age	Ministry	Party
Oliver Munyaradzi	M.D., U. of Natal, South Africa; Fellow, Royal College of Surgeons, England	Shona (probably Karanga)	48	Health	ZANU-PF
Dzingai Mutumbuka	Ph.D., Chemistry, U. of Sussex, England	Shona (Karanga)	36	Education and Culture	ZANU-PF
Simon Muzenda	High school	Shona (Karanga)	59	Deputy Prime Minister	ZANU-PF
Callistus Ndllovu	Ph.D., History, State U. of New York, Stony Brook, United States	Shona (Kalanga)	46	Construction	PF-ZAPU
Daniel Ngenya	Unknown	Probably Ndebele	59	Roads and Road Traffic	PF-ZAPU
Teurai Ropa Nhongo (Ms.)	Little formal education	Shona (Zezuru)	27	Community Development and Women's Affairs	ZANU-PF
Enos Nkala	LL.B., B. Commerce, U. of South Africa (by correspondence)	Ndebele	50	National Supplies	ZANU-PF
John Nkomo	Teachers Training College	Shona (Kalanga)	47	Minister of State (assisting Muzenda)	PF-ZAPU
Denis Norman	High school	White	51	Agriculture	Independent
Maurice Nyagumbo	About 6th grade	Shona (Manyika)	57	Mines	ZANU-PF
Sydney Sekeremayi	M.B., Ch.B., U. of Lund, Sweden; Diploma, Tropical Medicine, U. of Stockholm, Sweden	Shona (Zezuru)	38	Minister of State (Defense)	ZANU-PF
Nathan Shamuyarira	Ph.D., Political Science, Princeton U., U.S.A.	Shona (Zezuru)	52	Information, Posts and Telecommunications	ZANU-PF
Frederick Shava	Diploma and M.S. in Nematology, Doctorate in Medical Parasitology, U. of London, England	Shona (probably Zezuru)	32	Manpower Planning and Development	ZANU-PF
Herbert Ushewokonzwe	B.S., Medicine and Surgery, U. of Natal, South Africa	Shona (Zezuru)	43	Home Affairs	ZANU-PF
Tarisai Ziyambi	Unknown	Shona (Karanga)	Unknown	Minister of State (National Coordination)	ZANU-PF
Eddison Zvobgo	LL.B., U. of London, England (by correspondence); M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and LL.M., Harvard U., United States	Shona (Karanga)	46	Legal and Parliamentary	ZANU-PF

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particularly the former Rhodesian African Rifles—demonstrated their loyalty to Mugabe at the time of the fighting in Bulawayo in February 1981. The reliability of these forces—at least that of the Air Force—in any military operations against South Africa would be questionable, however, because of the close ties between them and the South African military during the Rhodesian civil war. There are only about 1,000 whites left in the armed forces (900 in the Air Force and 100 in the Army).

37. The bulk of the former ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas have been integrated into 37 newly formed battalions, patched together with much potential for political/tribal conflict. These are essentially shadow military units incapable of combat operations. If they were ordered to repress violence between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF, they would probably break up along tribal/party lines—as three such battalions did during the violence in Bulawayo last year.

38. The government's decision to create a 5th Brigade and a presidential guard battalion drawn almost entirely from ZANU-PF personnel reflects its concern over the reliability of the integrated battalions and over too great a dependence on the former Rhodesian forces. The publicly stated mission of the North Korean-trained brigade is to suppress internal dissidence, which Nkomo interpreted long before his dismissal to mean that ZANU-PF would use the brigade as an instrument for creating a one-party state. Once operational, the 5th Brigade could be the most powerful unit in the Army, the only one combining mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery.

39. Mugabe undoubtedly values the ZANU-PF presence in the military, but he also is aware that some of his leading critics within the party last July were from ZANU-PF's military wing. Army Commander Lt. Gen. Rex Nhongo, Maj. Gen. Josiah Tungamirai, Brigadier Sheba Gava, and intelligence chief Munan-gagwa then were the most prominent signers of a petition that criticized Mugabe for leaving the party out of the government's policymaking process. Mugabe's recent decision to make his Zezuru protege Sekeremayi Minister of State for Defense could reflect a desire to reduce their political influence.

40. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police are responsible for internal security. Though both organizations have lost

experienced personnel since independence, they retain a significant operational capability. Neither force has had an integration program comparable to that of the Army, and standards for new recruits from among former guerrilla personnel remain high. About 2,000 whites are left in the 9,500-man police force and about 40 or 50 in the CIO.

Social and Economic Trends

Slower Growth, Rising Inflation and Unemployment

41. Zimbabwe has the potential to grow faster than most developing countries because it has vigorous commercial agriculture, a sizable and relatively diversified manufacturing sector, vast and varied mineral resources, skilled managers and technicians, and a well-educated black middle class. The real growth rate averaged 6.5 percent annually from 1965 to 1974 and, after a five-year downturn because of the worsening civil war and the deterioration of the international economy, rebounded to more than 10 percent in 1980 and about 8 percent in 1981.

42. The removal of international economic sanctions after the settlement at Lancaster House spurred Zimbabwe's economic resurgence. The rise in the price of gold also provided an initial boost. Though base metal prices dropped in 1981, the effect was offset by a near doubling in corn production. This yielded a 1.5-million-ton surplus, the result of good weather and an increase in the price paid by the government to farmers.

43. This impressive recovery strained the economy in several ways. Transportation bottlenecks—the result of shortages of locomotives and freight cars, the loss of skilled manpower, and the bumper corn harvest—delayed export shipments worth as much as \$8 million per week in foreign exchange earnings. The inability to get exports to market on a timely basis and a postindependence foreign buying spree to meet consumer demand and replenish wornout capital stock strained the balance of payments. This and conservative debt management policies led Zimbabwe to draw down its foreign currency reserves to an equivalent of less than two months' imports by the end of 1980 and to ask the International Monetary Fund late in 1981 for a \$126 million loan to cover short-term balance-of-payments needs. The IMF's tough terms, however, particularly its insistence on reduced government

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spending on social programs, may persuade Zimbabwe's leaders that they can do without IMF assistance.

44. The government's ability to carry out its reconstruction and development plans will depend largely on the generosity of Western donors. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) in March 1981 yielded pledges of \$1.8 billion, mainly from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the collective European Community. Of the ZIMCORD money, \$1.1 billion is earmarked for land resettlement and rural development and \$300 million each is for refugee resettlement and manpower training. Prolonged recession in the West could delay delivery on these pledges.

45. The economy is not expected to grow faster than 3 or 4 percent annually over the next few years. Sluggish export earnings are already dictating cuts of as much as 40 percent in foreign currency allocations. This rationing will pinch the economy even further. The recession in the industrialized world will keep demand for Zimbabwe's minerals depressed through early next year at least. Inventories have been so depleted by the recession and by high interest rates, however, that the lag in the recovery of Zimbabwean chromium and ferrochrome is likely to be much shorter than the usual six months.

46. Inflation, currently in the 15- to 20-percent range, and unemployment, now 20 percent or more, probably will continue to be high. The economy would have to grow about 6 percent annually merely to keep the unemployment rate from increasing. The situation is made worse by the planned demobilization of 25,000 to 30,000 men from the Army and the anticipated return of at least some of the roughly 20,000 legal and 40,000 to 70,000 illegal Zimbabwean workers in South Africa, in addition to the normal annual increment of 80,000 to the work force.

The Role of Foreign Capital

47. One of the keys to economic growth in Zimbabwe is the attitude of foreign investors. From a Western perspective, the best way for Zimbabwe to develop its great potential, to create jobs for its fast-growing population, to enlarge the economic pie so that everyone can have a larger share, and to provide the government with increased revenue so that it can

afford social programs to redress economic inequities would be through massive injections of direct foreign investment. The country could not accomplish as much relying solely on its domestic capital pool or on that plus foreign aid and commercial and official borrowing abroad that would have to be repaid, with interest, in scarce foreign exchange.

48. A basic problem that foreign capital faces in Zimbabwe, however, is the anticapitalist bias of most of the country's political leadership. For historical reasons, capitalism and the private sector are associated in Zimbabwean eyes with everything that the liberation movements have fought to eradicate: white rule, racism, colonialism, imperialism, and South African dominance. Mugabe's personal anticapitalist bias has a strong puritanical flavor. He regards capitalism's emphasis on individualism as basically selfish and immoral and believes that natural resources belong to all the people and should not be controlled by private interests.

49. The Mugabe government aims to reduce the domination of the economy by capitalists and foreign companies—mainly South African, British, and American. The level of foreign ownership is about 90 percent in mining and 60 percent in commerce and industry. Since few black businessmen have the means to invest heavily in the private sector, the government seeks to take a "commanding" position itself through outright purchases or joint ventures. In theory, it prefers to extend state participation to every sector of the economy rather than to encourage the creation of a new class of black capitalists who, while altering the racial composition of ownership, would be committed to the entrenchment of capitalism rather than the transformation of Zimbabwe into a socialist state.

50. In practice, despite much talk about state intervention, there has been little action. The government's only business "takeovers" thus far—a major bank, the country's largest newspaper group, and a film production corporation—were purchased from willing sellers. The government's main purpose in these actions was to reduce South African ownership in the economy.

51. The recent legislation establishing a Minerals Marketing Corporation (MMC) empowers the government to act as the sole marketing agent for the country's \$600 million a year mining industry. The MMC is expected to move cautiously, however, taking

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as long as five years before exercising effective control over some minerals. Initially, it plans only to review and approve existing contracts and to authorize new sales proposals. As it gains experience with the marketing practices of the various minerals, it will gradually execute contracts itself, take charge of consignments offered by producers, handle deliveries, and return earnings minus a commission. The MMC does not plan to take complete responsibility for all marketing functions, including initiating sales, until the final stage.

52. The government does not intend to disrupt existing minerals marketing arrangements that provide an adequate return. South African mining interests fear that Mugabe is under pressure from North Korea, Romania, Bulgaria, and other Communist states to repay them for their support in the liberation struggle by making key minerals available at below-market prices. The government has not been willing to do this thus far, however, and industry officials believe the MMC will try to operate as a profitmaking institution.

53. Moves to explore for new mineral deposits or to expand by firms with existing operations have slowed drastically since the initial postindependence mining boom because of depressed markets, rising costs, and uncertainty over how the MMC will affect them. Dozens of other foreign companies have visited Zimbabwe since independence, but virtually all have decided to hold off making commitments until the investment climate is more settled. Union Carbide and the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa have offered the government a major stake in their Zimbabwean companies.

54. The Mugabe government has stated repeatedly that it welcomes foreign investment, but it has not offered many practical inducements. As a result, new foreign investment since independence has amounted to only about \$35 million, and net investment may actually be negative given the white exodus.

55. Until recently, Chidzero and other moderates have argued that it was better to consider each new investment proposal on a case-by-case basis than to codify general rules for foreign investment that would probably be more restrictive. The lack of an investment code has increased the uncertainty of foreign investors, however, and Chidzero has recently responded to Western prodding by ordering the drafting of guidelines that could develop into such a code.

56. Chidzero also favors reconsidering an Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement with the United States, which the cabinet has resisted because of sensitivity over the Moynihan amendment that links future US aid with a country's voting record in international forums. Mugabe argues that an OPIC agreement is unnecessary because the Zimbabwean Constitution guarantees property against expropriation without compensation.

A Dual Economy

57. A great gap exists between the sophisticated, modern sector of the Zimbabwean economy, which accounts for 95 percent of its total output, and the traditional rural sector within which the vast majority of the people live. About 6 percent of the people control 80 percent of the wealth, and the average real income of blacks is less than 10 percent that of whites.

58. Zimbabwe's population is growing at a rate of 3.3 percent per year, one of the fastest in the world. The pressure is greatest in poor, rural areas, where it is least supportable. Migration to the cities, which hold only one-fifth of the population, is increasing at a brisk 6.6 percent annually. This puts additional pressure on the government to extend basic services to blacks.

59. The main beneficiaries of the government's social programs have been blacks in urban areas where educational and health facilities are most readily available. Little of the more than \$1 billion of official Western aid earmarked for rural areas has been disbursed to date because of slow donor followup and local administrative shortcomings. As a result, many schools still operate without adequate structures, books, or personnel. Even where money is available, a lack of trained extension agents and health officers seriously hampers implementation.

60. The government's modest attempts to satisfy black aspirations have nevertheless put a serious strain on the budget. Government spending on education, which was steady at about 5 percent of the Rhodesian budget from 1974 to 1978, has risen to more than \$500 million, or 18 percent of the total. To cover part of the cost, the government enacted a series of progressive tax measures last year that hit whites—as the main domestic investors and high income consumers—particularly hard.

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The Problem of Land

61. In the countryside, land patterns set essentially in the colonial period continue to this day. Almost half of the land is owned by the country's nearly 5,000 white commercial farmers and a few absentee landlords and foreign corporations. This is the best land in the country, and much of it is underutilized or unused. It is divided among vast cattle ranches and large farms of maize, tobacco, and other commercial crops. These commercial farms employ about 38 percent of the blacks engaged in the market economy.

62. Most of the remaining land consists of the former Tribal Trust Lands, now called Communal Lands, where about 4.5 million of the country's 8 million people live under crowded, subsistence conditions. This land has been seriously damaged by primitive cultivation practices, overgrazing, and overpopulation. Soil depletion is so serious in many areas that it is probably no longer possible to regenerate it even with better farming techniques and fertilizers.

63. Since independence, large numbers of squatters have taken up illegal residence on unused or unoccupied white farmland, 55,000 in Manicaland alone. Most have spilled over from the Communal Lands onto adjacent land abandoned during the war. Some are refugees displaced by the war or former farmworkers who remained on the land after it was abandoned. A growing number are opportunists from the urban middle class who have taken possession of land with the hope that the government would eventually grant them formal ownership. The government's unwillingness to confront squatters is creating a chaotic substitute for orderly resettlement.

Land Reform

64. The squatter problem has been aggravated by the slow pace of land reform. The government has moved slowly largely because it has not wished to impair the production of the white commercial farmers who earn more than one-third of the country's foreign exchange, produce most of its food, and employ almost 400,000 black laborers. The "normal" program has resettled only about 6,200 black families on 247,000 hectares at a cost of slightly over \$20 million. This program is time consuming and expensive because care is taken to provide skills and infra-

structure (water, roads, dip tanks for cattle, and schools) required for long-term development. An additional 2,700 families have been resettled under an "accelerated" scheme that meets the political need to show rapid results but does not require the complex bureaucratic evaluation and preparation of land and applicant that characterize the "normal" program. In many cases, the government simply bought land to turn it over to the squatters who already were occupying it. An additional 1,000 families have been resettled on five cooperative farms.

65. The gap between the government's promises of extensive land redistribution and the reality becomes more apparent every day. Although political pressure to do more is growing, the government is aided by the fact that many on the Communal Lands are reluctant to move. This may partly explain why the government has spent at least three times as much money to improve conditions in the Communal Lands than on resettlement. Doing so has also provided demonstrable benefits to large numbers quickly.

66. The cabinet nonetheless has ambitious plans to have 54,000 families resettled by the end of this year and an additional 54,000 in each of the next two years. These plans seem unrealistic because the government has not yet worked out where the land, the support services, the water, or even the people would come from. While in theory there is enough land available to meet this year's goal without forcing any of the white commercial farmers off their land, to resettle all 162,000 families would require 12 million of the 16 million hectares owned by whites, risk sharp cuts in agricultural export earnings, and could cost \$300 million or more.

67. Mugabe has said on more than one occasion that his government would not hesitate to seize land without compensation if Western donors do not come up with more money to purchase land for resettlement. The government has not confiscated any land so far, however, and it has gone to great lengths—in one case paying nine times the original worth of a farm—to pay compensation. Thus, Mugabe's threat seems to be largely bluster to reassure frustrated blacks, to persuade white farmers to sell at reasonable prices, and to press British and other donors to provide more aid. It also reflects the widespread belief among Zimbabwean blacks that the land really was stolen by the whites

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years ago and that only a distasteful compromise at Lancaster House forced Mugabe and Nkomo to agree to compensation.

68. Mugabe believes that his constitutional obligation to pay compensation is contingent on the concomitant obligation of the sponsors of the Lancaster House settlement—the United Kingdom and, in Zimbabwean eyes, the United States (even though the United States had no formal role at the conference)—to provide funds to help the government buy out the white farmers. British aid has financed half the cost of the “normal” program thus far, and London is committed to spending an additional \$50 million on that program. The United States has specifically refused to allow US aid to be used to buy land, but the earlier Kissinger and Anglo-American proposals of a fund of up to \$1.5 billion, plus a US pledge to provide aid for agricultural development at a crucial point during the negotiations at Lancaster House, entail a moral obligation in Zimbabwean eyes. Thus, Harare considers the US aid pledge of \$75 million per year for three years as no more than its due.

South Africa's Economic Leverage

69. The Achilles heel of the Zimbabwean economy is its dependence on South Africa. The key to this dependence is the line of rail introduced by Cecil Rhodes around the turn of the century that links South African ports with the economies of southern and central Africa as far north as Shaba Region in Zaire. Because of the shortcomings or disruption of alternative rail routes through Mozambique, Angola, and Tanzania, the “southern route” through Zimbabwe provides the main transportation net for the region.

70. Zimbabwe has no practical alternative to South Africa as the main channel for its external trade. Although Mozambique used to handle 75 percent of Rhodesia's transit trade before the collapse of Portuguese rule, the Mozambican rail and port network has deteriorated badly since then. Because of the huge amount of capital that would be required to improve these facilities and a shortage of skilled Mozambicans to run them, Zimbabwe will remain heavily dependent on the South African transport system for at least the next decade. The plans of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to develop an alternate transportation infrastructure

would require capital investment far in excess of its members' capabilities and of their apparent ability to attract foreign donors and investors.³

71. Virtually all of Zimbabwe's refined petroleum products are imported via South Africa. The reopening of the petroleum pipeline from the Mozambican port of Beira to Mutare (formerly Umtali) in eastern Zimbabwe would at least partially relieve this dependence, but the pipeline will remain vulnerable to attack by the National Resistance of Mozambique (NRM) insurgents who are trained, supplied, and guided by Pretoria. Moreover, Zimbabwe is having trouble negotiating fees for petroleum transshipments through Mozambique that are competitive with those charged by South Africa.

72. Over 80 percent of Zimbabwe's foreign trade currently passes through South Africa, and South Africa is Zimbabwe's single most important trading partner. Bilateral trade was enhanced by South Africa's role as a supplier and middleman throughout the period of Rhodesia's unilaterally declared independence, 1965-79, and by a preferential trade agreement that dates back to 1964. As a result of unpublicized bilateral negotiations recently, Pretoria has not followed up on its threat to allow the trade agreement to expire in March 1982. The agreement will remain in force as negotiations continue, saving Zimbabwe the loss of \$40-75 million in annual foreign exchange earnings and 3,000 or more jobs. The agreement also serves Pretoria by reinforcing Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa.

73. South Africa also has been Zimbabwe's leading creditor. Pretoria provided the Smith and Muzorewa regimes with most of the aid needed to keep the economy running and to finance the increasingly costly war. Much of this aid was in the form of grants and soft loans, but by the time of the Lancaster House settlement, the official debt had reached at least \$500 million. The Zimbabwean Government is continuing to meet payments on these loans, and Zimbabwe is also honoring its private commercial debt to South Africa of about \$500 million. Pretoria offered to make an additional official loan shortly after Zimbabwean in-

³ The SADCC was created in April 1980 by nine black-ruled southern African states in an effort to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa and to promote regional development. SADCC members are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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dependence, but it is doubtful that the Mugabe government accepted or received any such loan.

74. South Africa is the largest single foreign investor in Zimbabwe, accounting for about \$1 billion of the country's total foreign investment of approximately \$3 billion. This is also South Africa's largest concentration of external investment, perhaps 30 percent of the total. The Anglo American Corporation controls nickel and coal production in Zimbabwe, is second only to Union Carbide as a chrome producer, and has a major stake in gold mining, sugar, cotton, and citrus fruits. Much of the rest of South African investment in Zimbabwe is disguised to conceal its true ownership, for example, by transferring control of a Zimbabwean company to a London subsidiary with a different name and a non-South African board of directors.

75. Because Zimbabwe needs South African economic cooperation far more than South Africa needs Zimbabwe, Harare is in a weak position to retaliate economically against Pretoria. Any attempt to do so—say, by restricting repatriation of profits to South Africa, nationalizing South African investments, defaulting on debts, or expelling South African nationals—would risk provoking Pretoria to cut Zimbabwe's access to its rail facilities and ports or to South African trade.

Foreign Relations

The Threat From South Africa

76. Pretoria generally seeks to use its economic leverage for political ends, providing incentives for Zimbabwe to have a nearly "normal" political/diplomatic relationship or, failing that, to induce Zimbabwe at least to maintain political contact. Zimbabwe has a trade mission in Johannesburg, and South Africa has one in Harare. Since November 1981 one or two Zimbabwean cabinet ministers have been holding unpublicized meetings with South African representatives about once a month. There is also some liaison between their respective intelligence services.

77. Zimbabwe's economic dependence also provides Pretoria with a powerful coercive weapon. When applying the stick rather than the carrot, Pretoria usually tries to mask its intent, as in rationalizing the withdrawal of its locomotives from Zimbabwe last year in terms of its own economic needs or in

justifying the repatriation of Zimbabwean workers by claiming that Zimbabwe had indicated that it wanted them back. Such explanations enable Pretoria to make plausible denials to foreign critics, but they do not fool Harare and probably they are not intended to do so.

78. Zimbabwe's relative military weakness also conditions its relations with Pretoria. Although Zimbabwe is stronger militarily than any of South Africa's other neighbors, it could mount only a modest defense against South African military power. It is also highly vulnerable to sabotage and other forms of covert action.

79. Zimbabwe's vulnerability to South African military and economic pressure is the reason why Harare has a longstanding policy of denying military support to anti-South African insurgent groups. Though Mugabe and other Zimbabwean leaders are committed to the cause of Namibian and South African liberation, they limit their authorized support to the political and moral realm. Zimbabwe has allowed the ANC/SA and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) to establish unofficial "offices" in Harare, but Mugabe has delayed allowing the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to open an office in Harare in part because, in light of the murder of the ANC/SA representative in July 1981, he is unsure of the ability of his security services to provide adequate protection.

80. Mugabe may be turning a blind eye to some anti-South African nationalist activity. There are perhaps 100 or 150 ANC/SA members among the former ZAPU guerrilla forces that have been integrated into the Zimbabwean Army. The ANC/SA apparently also has several "safehouses" in the country that presumably are used by refugees escaping from South Africa and possibly by ANC/SA operatives transiting Zimbabwe en route from Angola, Zambia, or Tanzania to South Africa. If Mugabe knows of such activities, he may tolerate them in part to woo the ANC/SA from its longstanding close association with PF-ZAPU.

81. Pretoria will do all it can to prevent a credible anti-South African insurgent threat from developing in Zimbabwe. South African leaders have warned repeatedly that they would not hesitate to launch attacks against "terrorist" bases in neighboring countries. Moreover, Pretoria will not tolerate Zimbabwean passivity in bringing anti-South African insurgent activity under control or accept professions of ignorance as an excuse for inaction.

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82. Pretoria also would like Zimbabwe to keep the tone of its rhetoric within what Pretoria regards as acceptable limits. South African officials take umbrage at the tendency of Mugabe and other Zimbabwean leaders to blame almost everything that goes wrong on "South African agents." They seem to be particularly offended by Zimbabwe's public calls for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, perhaps especially because Harare knows that it would not be able to observe such sanctions itself (at least not without massive foreign assistance) and says so.

to be positively gleeful at every sign of instability. Pretoria has always been suspicious of Mugabe and fully expects Zimbabwe to disintegrate eventually along tribal lines. It tends to interpret recent events as confirmation that Zimbabwe is moving inexorably down the same road that much of the rest of black Africa has traveled: from deteriorating economic and social conditions to a one-party socialist state, inter-tribal violence, and instability.

Other African and Third World States

86. Mozambique is Zimbabwe's closest friend in the region largely because of the strong support that the Machel regime gave to ZANU-PF during the last years of the war. The language of their joint communiques and other public statements makes them virtual allies: they have declared that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack on the other.

87. There are limits, however, to the extent of Mozambican-Zimbabwean military cooperation. Harare is not prepared to commit its forces to protect the Machel regime from NRM or direct South African attack because to do so would almost assure South African retaliation. The Zimbabwean military has provided logistic support for Mozambique's armed forces along their border, however, and the two countries are exchanging intelligence and coordinating their military movements in the border area. Harare also has positioned its forces in certain areas to prevent the NRM from using Zimbabwe as a sanctuary. At some point Mugabe might send some troops into Mozambique to defend the rail lines and the Beira-Mutare (Umtali) pipeline, but there is no solid evidence that Zimbabwean troops have yet been deployed in Mozambique.

88. Bilateral frictions, moreover, have begun to sour Zimbabwean-Mozambican relations in recent months. Mugabe has been disappointed by Maputo's attempt to charge a substantial tariff for Zimbabwe's use of the pipeline. Mugabe was also upset by Machel's gratuitous advice last December over how to handle Zimbabwe's security problems (by purging disloyal whites).

89. Zimbabwe's relations with most of the other Frontline States have long been notably cooler. Mugabe does not fully trust Zambia, Angola, or Botswana because of their support for Nkomo's forces during the

85. South Africans sometimes claim that a prosperous, stable Zimbabwe is in their interest, yet they tend

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war. He is particularly wary of Zambian President Kaunda, who allowed Zambia to be ZAPU's principal base and permitted Moscow and Havana to use Zambia as a principal conduit for their aid to Nkomo, although Zambian-Zimbabwean cooperation has increased in recent months. On the other hand, Mugabe looks up to Tanzania's Nyerere as an elder statesman of African nationalism and the longtime chairman of the Frontline States.

90. As the most prosperous and centrally located of the Frontline States, Zimbabwe is likely to play a gradually increasing role in coordinating the black states' challenge to South Africa's military and economic domination of the region and to white minority rule in South Africa and Namibia. Given the relative weakness of the Frontline vis-a-vis South African power, however, this challenge will probably be confined mainly to political maneuvering. Mugabe is a newcomer to the Namibian negotiations, but he is not above playing on Western concern about the possibility of a greater Communist role in southern Africa to gain greater Western economic aid and Western help in restraining Pretoria.

91. Mugabe is anxious to maintain Zimbabwe's non-aligned credentials, but always with special regard for those states—North Korea, China, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria—that gave the greatest support to ZANU during the liberation struggle. The North Koreans have special status because of their military advisory role. Although the Foreign Ministry has been offended by P'yongyang's heavyhanded diplomatic style, the Zimbabwean Army is generally pleased with the performance of the 106 North Korean advisers. It is not clear how long the advisers will remain in Zimbabwe, but the training may require at least one more year.

92. Cuba has cultivated a cordial but not close relationship with Zimbabwe, notwithstanding Havana's ties with Moscow and past support of Nkomo. Zimbabwean leaders generally believe that the Cubans have played a constructive role in Africa since the mid-1970s, particularly as a barrier to South African designs on Angola. Although Cuba's nonaligned credentials are by no means pure, Harare regards Havana as untainted by racism and its commitment to the liberation struggle as genuine. Zimbabwe recently accepted a Cuban offer to provide intelligence training for one military and two civilian officers but has rebuffed other offers of assistance.

The Major Powers

93. Zimbabwe's relations with the Soviet Union are much cooler. Mugabe distrusts Moscow because of its superpower status and its longstanding support for Nkomo. Mugabe did not agree to diplomatic relations until February 1981 and did so then in part as a gesture of conciliation toward Nkomo in the wake of the violence in Bulawayo. Though Zimbabwe subsequently allowed the Soviets to establish an embassy, it has not yet set up a mission in Moscow. Mugabe reportedly is planning to begin negotiations to open one in 1982, perhaps as a sign of friendship to offset Moscow's misgivings about his recent moves against Nkomo. Mugabe has, however, recently rebuffed Soviet attempts to establish intelligence liaison and to set up a permanent trade mission and has been dragging his feet on Moscow's request to negotiate a trade agreement. Zimbabwe voted against the Soviets on Afghanistan at the United Nations last November, but it has subsequently taken a softer position on Poland—regarding that situation as an internal Polish affair.

94. Zimbabwe's strongest Western ties are with the British because of their longstanding influence in the country and their role in arranging the settlement that led to black majority rule. London tends to hoard its political capital in Zimbabwe, however, normally restricting its demarches to matters of bilateral as distinct from broader Western interest. Britain's military advisers have played a key role in training and integrating the Zimbabwean Army and, though their number has been reduced from 160 to 85, will continue to be important as arbiters of factional disputes and managers of logistics. The British are spending about half of their foreign military training funds in Zimbabwe, but they may not be able to continue at this level.

95. Zimbabwean-US relations are generally good, but Harare's tendency to view the world through a Third World lens means that Zimbabwe will not side with Washington on many issues. Moreover, Zimbabwe resents any implication that US aid is conditional on how it votes in international forums.

96. Zimbabwean leaders think that the current US administration has been clumsy in its dealings with southern Africa. They attribute South Africa's increasing willingness to deal aggressively with Zimbabwe and its neighbors partly to the warming in US-South African relations. Harare also suspects that the propos-

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als of the Western Five Contact Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Canada) for a Namibian settlement favor South African interests.

Prospects and Implications for the United States

97. Zimbabwe is important to the United States because instability there would further unsettle the southern African region. Its intrinsic importance lies in its location astride major transport routes, its potential for leading the Frontline States in challenging Pretoria's economic and military domination of the region and white political control in South Africa itself, and its mineral resources.

98. It is in the US interest that Zimbabwe remain economically and politically stable, at peace with its neighbors, and open to Western influence. These objectives are most likely to be achieved under the continued leadership of Mugabe and, conversely, probably would be in jeopardy if he were to lose power in a political upheaval. Mugabe has served US interests by restricting the influence of the USSR and its allies in Zimbabwe. Mugabe also could play a helpful role in US efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

99. The key to stability will be Mugabe's ability and willingness to deal pragmatically with the country's diverse political, ethnic, and economic problems. This will not always be easy because his power rests in part on his responsiveness to the ZANU-PF Central Committee, which collectively tends toward more doctrinaire socialist policies and more radical Third World rhetoric.

100. In the near term, much will depend on how Mugabe handles Nkomo and his followers. Now that Nkomo has begun to speak out as if he were the leader of the opposition—which, in a sense, he has become—Mugabe may regret that he did not detain or prosecute him earlier. Doing so would still risk making a martyr of Nkomo, however, and provoking spontaneous violence and polarization of the political climate along tribal lines.

101. By refusing to flee into exile and by speaking out against the regime's actions against him and his party, Nkomo is in effect challenging Mugabe to prove his charges of treasonable intent. Nkomo retains a

great deal of support among the Ndebeles, and so long as he remains at large in the country and politically active, he will be a force to be reckoned with. Nkomo has always been a nimble and resilient politician, and it would not take much—no more, say, than evidence of one or more ZANU-PF arms caches similar to those found on the PF-ZAPU farms—to undermine the government's case against him.

102. Over the longer term, the absorption of PF-ZAPU by ZANU-PF (via an accommodation of some sort with the Ndebeles) seems likely. ZANU-PF has already won a number of PF-ZAPU converts, and others are willing to collaborate—enticed in part by the perquisites and patronage of office. The question is whether Mugabe and his Central Committee will make an arrangement with a post-Nkomo leadership or whether Nkomo will be able to hang on to the leadership of PF-ZAPU and they will have to deal with him.

103. With an eventual accommodation between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU (though their unity may never be much greater than that of the preindependence Patriotic Front), ZANU-PF may virtually be able to attain its goal of a one-party state prior to changing the constitution. The process will take time, however, and probably will not be neat and tidy. Indeed, ZANU-PF probably will have to settle for de facto one-party rule during the time frame of this paper and perhaps until after the entrenched clauses of the constitution expire in 1987 and 1990, as some whites or Muzorewa or Nkomo supporters are likely to deny it unanimous support in parliament.

104. Mugabe, nevertheless, probably will propose constitutional changes before the next national election comes due in 1985. These are likely to include not only a one-party state, but an executive presidency, a unicameral legislature, and elimination of dual citizenship. Mugabe probably will honor his pledge not to make changes unconstitutionally, however, remaining content with having tabled for discussion and future action those ideas for which he cannot muster sufficient votes.

105. More important, in terms of the realities of political power in the country, will be the national party congress of ZANU-PF that probably will be held within the next year or so. Mugabe will try to use this occasion to stack the ZANU-PF Central Committee

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with party members loyal to him personally, or at least to increase his influence. A key vacancy in the party hierarchy that remains to be filled is that of secretary general, second in the line of succession after party Vice President (and Deputy Prime Minister) Muzenda. Mugabe probably will try to place a fellow non-Karanga in the job, at least so long as Muzenda remains his deputy.

106. Mugabe probably will continue to rely on the emergency powers to maintain law and order and to intimidate and muzzle political opponents. Such tactics are likely to be useful in containing discontent over the shortcomings of the regime's social and economic performance. Conversely, the emergency powers could be used by Mugabe to press ahead with the "revolution."

107. Zimbabwe's economic problems are unlikely to be a source of serious instability over the next two to three years. Moreover, there are signs that local investors and at least some foreign companies are beginning to adjust to the country's new economic realities and are finding ways to live with them and still make a profit.

108. Given the likelihood that Mugabe will be able to maintain control domestically, the greatest threat to stability probably will be the external one—South Africa. Pretoria will use a combination of economic leverage and periodic covert actions to keep Zimbabwe dependent and to remind Harare of South Africa's ability to wreak havoc. Pretoria probably does not aim to overthrow Mugabe but rather to keep him on the defensive and to make him malleable to South African interests. Pretoria probably will raise and lower the pressure on Zimbabwe as it judges the situation requires.

109. Zimbabwe's attitude toward South Africa is a function of both bilateral and regional issues and, to a lesser extent, the broader international context. Zimbabwe assumes that Pretoria is hostile and that it will treat Zimbabwe, to the extent it can, as a pawn on a chessboard. Similarly, Zimbabwe assumes that Pretoria will try to treat its other neighbors in the same way.

110. Mugabe joined the other Frontline leaders at their summit in Maputo in March 1982 in their political pledge to the armed struggle against Pretoria in both Namibia and South Africa itself. The extent of

Mugabe's support for this pledge will depend in part on the success, or lack thereof, of the West—and particularly the United States—in getting South Africa to curb its aggressive policies toward Zimbabwe and its neighbors, to agree to a peaceful settlement in Namibia, and to begin at least to broaden political participation in South Africa.

111. The meeting in Maputo followed close on the heels of high-level Cuban visits to Zimbabwe and other Frontline States and of signs of stepped-up Cuban defensive military activity in Angola. If Zimbabwe were to support an increased Cuban security role in the Frontline States, this would not only raise the military ante in southern Africa but also create an opportunity for Moscow to improve its relations with Zimbabwe. Even so, Mugabe's suspicion of Moscow's intentions will act as a brake on any future warming trend. Moreover, Zimbabwe's recent acceptance of a Chinese offer to train 20 pilots and 20 armor and artillery personnel suggests an effort to maintain alternatives to support from Moscow or its allies.

Contingencies Affecting US Interests

A South African–Zimbabwean Conflict

112. Should South Africa respond to real, imagined, or exaggerated accounts of Zimbabwean support for the ANC/SA by launching raids on "terrorist bases" in Zimbabwe or by encouraging stepped-up NRM attacks on Mozambican transport and petroleum links, Harare probably would seek new and more sophisticated military equipment to beef up its defenses. If the West were not forthcoming, this would open the way for the Soviets or their surrogates to step in. Even if Mugabe resisted Soviet or Cuban offers of military assistance, Zimbabwean internal reactions to South African attacks probably would include a siege mentality, measures directed against whites, and possibly even nationalization of South African investments.

Internal Disorder

113. The breakdown of Mugabe's attempts to make an accommodation with the Ndebeles, the assassination of Mugabe, an unsuccessful assassination attempt, or a revolt against Mugabe from within his party would severely test Zimbabwe's fragile political fabric. Given the large numbers of weapons available throughout the country, widespread disorder or even

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civil war could result. If Pretoria intervened on the side of Nkomo or other antigovernment forces, a highly volatile mixture would result similar to that in the first contingency. The West's failure to respond to Harare's pleas for assistance against South African attacks would severely damage Western influence in Zimbabwe.

A Sharp Move to the Left

114. Increased socialist rhetoric alone will not lead to instability, but strong socialist measures would threaten and alarm whites and urban middle class blacks. The almost inevitable result would be political and racial polarization followed by fairly harsh government countermeasures. A spiral of tribal and class conflict probably would ensue. The first casualty would be the economy of Zimbabwe and notably its Western orientation. The confidence of the Zimbabwean and international business communities would be shaken, and Zimbabwe could begin to resemble

many Third World countries: lagging economic development, internecine conflict, power struggles, and little hope of reversing these trends.

Mugabe's Removal From the Scene


115. If Mugabe were to die in office or be incapacitated, his immediate successor most likely would be Muzenda, whose position as number two in both the party and the government seems secure. No Karanga has ever been elected president of ZANU-PF, however, so Muzenda might have difficulty gaining and maintaining the support of the non-Karanga majority in the party. A period of substantial ferment and testing of strength could result. Whoever becomes the next ZANU-PF secretary general would become a key player and potential contender in any succession struggle. The winner almost certainly would have to have impressive credentials in the ZANU-PF liberation movement.

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Percentage of Ndebele and Shona Speakers in Zimbabwe*



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